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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ADJUDICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT-
Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
After decades of obscurity, the Alien Tort Claims Act of 17891 has been
resurrected by human rights advocates to bring claims based on violations
of international human rights laws. Recent court decisions have differed,
however, on the correct application of the statute.2
In Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,3 a panel of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed a dismissal of
human rights claims brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but pub-
lished three separate and divergent opinions. Two of these opinions, by
Judges Robb and Bork, used broad separation of powers principles to
effectively foreclose review of any claims under the Act. 4
The separation of powers argument stems from the perspective that the
judiciary should have a restricted governmental role and avoid any inter-
ference with the political branches of government. 5 In Tel-Oren, the propo-
nents of this view used the traditionally narrow political question and act of
state doctrines to justify sweeping deference to the political branches, even
though the political branches had called for judicial action.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
2. Compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (district
court dismissed claims arising from terrorist attack for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985) with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (claim arising from torture by Paraguayan government official provides subject
matter jurisdiction; 10.4 million dollars in damages awarded on remand, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.
Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)) and De Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx)
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (The case was dismissed on reconsideration due to Argentina's appearance
to argue a sovereign immunity defense after defaulting in the original hearing. In the first hearing claims
for loss of expropriated property were dismissed due to the act of state doctrine, but 2.6 million dollars
in damages were awarded due to torture.).
3. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
4. Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
5. A number ofjudges believe courts should avoid reviewing actions taken by the political branches
or conflicts between the political branches. See, e.g., infra note 75; Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
997 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (the political question doctrine bars review of conflicts between
the political branches). Proponents of the restrictive judicial role also believe that courts should not fill a
"legislative" role in statutory interpretation. Even statutes written with few guidelines or definitions
should be narrowly interpreted. This view is apparent in recent rulings interpreting domestic civil rights
laws. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 interpreted not to permit affirmative action to retain minority firefighters during
layoffs unless it can be proven that a discriminatory practice had an impact on each individual); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (Civil Rights Act of 1871 interpreted to
disallow punitive damages against municipalities even for malicious conduct by policymaking officials
in violation of constitutional rights).
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It is not the dismissal of the Tel-Oren claims that makes the decision
significant-that was predictable given the particular facts of the case. 6 It is
the reasoning of the concurring judges and the effect that reasoning may
have on future litigation of human rights claims that is important. Given the
lack of a centralized court system in the international community, enforce-
ment of international laws protecting human rights depends upon adjudica-
tions in domestic courts. 7 The ultimate resolution of the separation of
powers issues raised by the Tel-Oren opinions will affect all later cases
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (section 1350), and may eliminate
all opportunities for United States courts to adjudicate human rights viola-
tions. 8 That, in turn, will detrimentally affect existing international laws,
and disrupt the development of future laws. 9
This Note examines the opinions in Tel-Oren that relied upon separation
of powers principles to foreclose adjudication of section 1350 suits. The
Note explores the underlying reasons for advocating judicial deference on
foreign affairs issues. Judge Robb's application of the political question
doctrine to Tel-Oren, and Judge Bork's use of both the political question
and act of state doctrines as evidence of separation of powers principles that
require judicial abstention, are analyzed in detail. Alternative principles
that limit jurisdiction over such claims are examined, including the act of
state doctrine, sovereign immunity, forum non conveniens, and the evi-
dence required to establish the existence of a customary international law.
The Note concludes that a broad deference doctrine is inappropriate. The
Constitution does not require judicial abstention, and the political branches
of government have assigned responsibility for section 1350 claims to the
courts. Furthermore, a broad deference doctrine is unnecessary because
other jurisdictional principles will prevent a flood of section 1350 claims in
United States courts. Finally, refusing jurisdiction may have the very effect
on foreign affairs that the proponents of the deference doctrine seek to
avoid.
6. See infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
7. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 65 (1964)
("[T]he decentralized quality of international law places a special burden upon all legal institutions at
the national level. Domestic courts are agents of a developing international legal order . . . ").
8. The issues raised were (1) whether § 1350 is solely a jurisdictional statute and requires an
independent cause of action, and (2) whether separation of powers principles require courts to decline
jurisdiction over § 1350 claims. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). The reasoning used in
Tel-Oren to justify dismissal of § 1350 claims would also apply to claims involving international law
issues brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdiction). See infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
9. Domestic courts are not only the primary judicial enforcement mechanism for international law,
but also play an important role in the development of customary international law. See R. FALK, supra
note 7, at 11-12 (states will have no reason to abide by international laws that conflict with domestic
interests if such laws are only applied when they advance foreign policies).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
The Alien Tort Claims Act was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.10 It
confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."'" Although the legislative history is unrecorded, it is
apparent that section 1350 was part of the federalist effort to ensure that
federal rather than state courts would handle cases involving foreigners and
foreign affairs. 12
Few cases have been brought under section 1350 since its enactment in
1789. Prior to 1980, courts had sustained jurisdiction only twice: once in a
1795 maritime seizure case, 13 and once in a 1961 child custody case. 14
Courts had never justified -denials of jurisdiction by broad separation of
powers principles. Dismissals generally were based on either the absence
of a tort, 15 or the lack of a violation of the law of nations. 16 Dicta in two
cases suggested that nationals could not bring claims against their own
state. 1
7
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), I Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 517 (A. Hamilton) (1 Mod. Library ed. 1941) ("IThe federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are con-
cerned."); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 n.25 (1964). For an
explanation of federal and state concurrent jurisdiction under § 1350, see Comment, The Loneliness of
the Long Distance Statute, The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1263, 1263 n.3 (1980). The original statute stated that the grant of federal jurisdiction was concurrent
with state jurisdiction. This language was deleted by later reenactments of the statute, but rules of
construction indicate that the meaning was not changed because federal courts only have exclusive
jurisdiction when it is explicitly reserved. Id. The fact that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
§ 1350 claims probably indicates that the federalists had to compromise and succeeded only in ensuring
access to federal courts for claims by aliens, not exclusive jurisdiction by the federal judiciary.
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26,
43-48 (1952).
13. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
14. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (wrongful withholding of
child custody was a tort, and concealing child's name and nationality on mother's passport violated
international law).
15. Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (suit to recover
proceeds of a life insurance policy was based on either a "tort" or the "law of nations"); Moxon v.
Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (suit for restitution of property not a "tort" action,
although claim for damages due to trespass would be a tort).
16. E.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir.) (racial discrimination not a violation
of international law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) ; IITv. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975) ("Thou shalt not steal" is not part of international law); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,
225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (negligence not a violation of international law).
17. Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 31; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015.
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In the 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 18 the Second Circuit affirmed
that a district court had jurisdiction over a claim by the family of a
Paraguayan torture victim. The claim was brought against the torturer, an
official of Paraguay who was present in the United States. The Second
Circuit determined that torture had become a violation of international
customary law. ' 9 Therefore, because the plaintiffs had alleged a violation
of the law of nations, jurisdiction existed under section 1350.
The Filartiga court requested an advisory memorandum from the State
Department concerning the proper interpretation of section 1350,20 but did
not consider broad separation of powers principles. Like the courts in prior
section 1350 cases, the Second Circuit assumed that the statute required
judicial action rather than abstention, even though foreign relations issues
were involved.2 1
In the most recent case involving section 1350, De Blake v. Republic of
Argentina,22 a California district court accepted jurisdiction over a claim by
an Argentine businessman for torture by Argentine government officials.
Although the court considered the act of state doctrine, it did not consider
broad separation of powers principles. 23 Argentina defaulted in the original
suit, but later petitioned successfully for reconsideration of the case, and
the court dismissed the claims due to the sovereign immunity defense. 24
B. Separation of Powers Principles in Foreign Affairs
The separation of powers argument used by Judges Robb and Bork to
justify the dismissal of Tel-Oren is based on the idea that foreign relations
are the province of the political branches and action by the courts may cause
18. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
19. Id. at 884. Numerous law review articles were written regarding the Filartiga decision. In
addition to those cited in notes 12 and 135, see, e.g., Human Rights Symposium. 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. I
(1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Law as the Rule of Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REv.
874 (1981); Note, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations: An Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 16
TEX. INT'L L.J. 117 (1981).
20. The State Department's reply was contained in Memorandum for the United States Submitted
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 585 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
21. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 ("Congress provided . ..for federal jurisdiction over suits by
aliens where principles of international law are at issue"); see Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135, 1177 (1970) (unconstitutional
for the courts to foreclose determination on the merits of cases over which they have jurisdiction).
22. No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (case dismissed upon reconsideration
after Argentina's decision to present a sovereign immunity defense).
23. Id.
24. De Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx) (C.D. Cal. March 7, 1985)
(vacating default judgment and dismissing action).
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interference or embarassment. 25 To support the separation of powers argu-
ment, Judges Robb and Bork turned to two narrow doctrines of judicial
abstention. Judge Robb relied entirely on the political question doctrine to
justify the refusal of jurisdiction over section 1350 claims.26 Judge Bork
used the political question and act of state doctrines as evidence of underly-
ing separation of powers issues that in his view justify judicial abstention on
a broad range of foreign relations issues.27
1. The Political Question Doctrine
Continuous controversy has surrounded the political question doctrine.
Scholars disagree on whether it exists at all, and if it does exist, on whether
it is constitutionally defined or is a flexible, prudential tool to protect the
court's authority.28 A political question commonly arises when a claim
directly challenges actions or policies of the executive or legislative
branches. 29 The courts do not abstain from all review of a political ques-
tion, but rather determine that the political branches have acted within their
constitutional powers, then abstain from reviewing the merits of the actions
taken. 30
25. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 802; see also De Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,1550 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., dissenting).
26. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
28. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9
(1961) ("[Ihe only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the
Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the
courts. . . .[W]hat is involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation.); and Henkin, Is
There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622 (1976) ("The 'political question'
doctrine, I conclude, is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines that has
misled lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put there and make it far more than the sum
of its parts.") with Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 46 (1961) ("[O]nly by means of a play on words can the broad discretion that the courts have in
fact exercised be turned into an act of constitutional interpretation. . . .There is something different
about it. . .something of prudence, not construction and not principle."); see also DeArellano, 745
F.2d at 1514 (the court refers to the issues affecting application of the political question doctrine as
"prudential, separation-of-powers concerns").
29. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion Cases)
(Congress can pass statutes that abrogate treaties); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415
(1839) (judicial determination of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands might contradict claims by the
United States government); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Congress can
denounce treaties), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). A political question also may arise when a case
involves a conflict between the executive and legislative branches. Compare Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) with id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See
generally Bickel, supra note 28; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Tigar, supra note 21; Wechsler, supra note 28.
30. Henkin, supra note 28, at 599; see also id. at 598 n.4 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
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In Baker v. Carr3 1 the Supreme Court tried to end the general confusion
surrounding the political question doctrine by listing factors that indicate
the presence of a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determinination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.32
The doctrine only applies if one of these factors is "inextricable from the
case." 33 Courts must determine whether the doctrine applies on a case-by-
case basis, not by "cataloguing" case types. 34
To justify application of the political question doctrine in the context of
foreign affairs, courts often cite the Supreme Court's statement in the early
case of Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 35 that courts may not inquire into the
conduct of foreign relations. 36 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
formulation of Oetjen in Baker, stating that not every case or controversy
involving foreign relations is beyond judicial review.37
Cranch) 137. 166 (1803) ("[W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive
discretion may be used, still there exists . . . no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political. . . . [Bleing entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.").
31. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32. Id. at 217; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell indicated that the political question doctrine incorporated three inquiries:
(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a
coordinate branch of Government?
(ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?
33. 369 U.S. at 217.
34. Id.
35. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
36. Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1984); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork. J..
concurring).
37. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212. Action relating to foreign affairs has been reviewed when it exceeds
constitutional authority. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 587-88 (1952)
(President Truman lacked authority to seize the nation's steel mills even in the context of the Korean
War): Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) (Japanese Relocation Cases) (decided on the merits in spite of "war powers" justification): see
also Memorandum, supra note 20, at 603 ("[T]he protection of fundamental human rights is not
committed exclusively to the political branches of government."). Cases involving the protection of
individual rights have typically been reviewed on the merits even when foreign relations issues were
involved. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
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The Baker Court then examined a variety of foreign affairs issues and
concluded that judicial deference should be accorded to prior explicit
governmental determinations such as treaty terminations, recognition of
foreign governments, and sovereignty over disputed territory.38 Even in
these areas courts can construe executive statements that are not clearly
definitive. 39As the Court stated, "[D]eference rests on reason, not habit. ",40
Although the political question doctrine is often invoked, it has rarely
prevented a determination on the merits.41 In the past two decades, a
majority of the Supreme Court has found a nonjusticiable political question
only once.42 For the most part, lower courts also have been circumspect in
applying the doctrine. 43
The recent cases in which the doctrine has been determinative involved
direct challenges to executive actions.44 For example, in Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan,45 the plaintiffs directly challenged the Executive's foreign
policies in Latin America by seeking damages for injuries caused by United
States-sponsored rebels in Nicaragua, and by seeking to stop the alleged
38. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212-14.
39. Id. at 212-13.
40. Id. at 213.
41. Even in Baker, the Court held that the political question doctrine should not prevent a
determination on the merits. Id. at 228. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 314-33 (1936) (Supreme Court reviewed on merits though often cited as evidence of an
exclusive realm of executive power in foreign affairs); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-90 (1952) (frequently cited for the discussion of the political question doctrine in the context of
immigration issues, yet determined on the merits); Stern, The Political Question Doctrine in State
Courts, 35 S.C.L. REv. 405,406 (1984); Tigar, supra note 21, at 1168 (Court will apply rules of written
and customary international law when neither Executive nor Congress act and there is no commitment
of the decision-making power to either of these branches).
42. The only Supreme Court majority opinion that appears to apply the political question doctrine
is Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (5-4 decision) (suit by Kent State University students seeking
injunction to prevent further actions by the Ohio National Guard). In the plurality memorandum
opinion in Goldwater, fourJustices found a nonjusticiable political question. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979)
(Rehnquist, L, with Justices Burger, Stewart, and Stevens, concurring).
43. De Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1514 ("[I1t is clear that the doctrine is, at best, a narrow one."). An
exception occurred during the Vietnam War when a large number of claims were dismissed by lower
courts as nonjusticiable political questions. See Henkin, supra note 26, at 623-24 n.74.
44. See, e.g., Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984) (suit to compel action by the
United States Secretary of State under the Hostage Act); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (challenge to U.S. military involvement in El Salvador), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533
(1984); Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424,425 (2d Cir. 1983) (abrogation or modification of a
treaty by superseding legislation presents nonjusticiable political question); Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982) (abandonment by Congress of unit of conversion
specified by Warsaw Convention); Freiberg v. Muskie, 651 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1981) (action to
compel United States State Department to intervene on plaintiff's behalf with officials of West German
government); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596,597-98 (D.D.C. 1983) (suit fordamages
due to U.S. involvement in Nicaragua and to enjoin military activities).
45. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983).
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"undeclared war" in Nicaragua and enjoin operation of paramilitary train-
ing camps in Florida. The Sanchez-Espinoza court applied several of the
factors listed in Baker, and declared that the claims were nonjusticiable
political questions.46
In a 1984 case, Flynn v. Shultz,47 the Seventh Circuit applied the political
question doctrine in a suit to compel Secretary of State Shultz to take action
under The Hostage Act. 48 The court stated that executive or legislative
actions in foreign affairs are sometimes reviewable, 49 but held that in this
case the court lacked "manageable standards" due to the vague termi-
nology of the applicable statute. 5°
2. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine bars United States courts from examining the
validity of some types of public acts committed by foreign states within
their own territories. 5 1 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,52 the
Supreme Court explained that the doctrine is not required by the Constitu-
tion and does not remove all foreign acts of state from judicial review. The
doctrine merely expresses the concern that judicial evaluation of foreign
acts of state may sometimes interfere with this country's foreign policy
goals. 53
The Court was careful to limit its application of the act of state doctrine
to the facts in Sabbatino.54 Since Sabbatino, courts have applied the
doctrine almost exclusively to similar fact patterns involving a foreign
state's expropriation of property within its own territory. 55
46. Id. at 597-98 (lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards; resolution of claims
would seriously impinge on conduct of foreign policy).
47. 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 1193.
49. Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1191.
50. Id. at 1193.
51. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S 250, 252 (1897) ("[T]he courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. ") (emphasis added).
See generally G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 127 (1981); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of
the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A
History of Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 677, 683 (1977).
52. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
53. The Supreme Court explained that the act of state doctrine is not constitutionally required
although it arises from concerns regarding the different roles of the governmental branches. The
doctrine does not bar judicial review of all acts by foreign states. 376 U.S. at 423.
54. Id. at 428.
55. E.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889-90 (act of state doctrine probably would not apply to torture by
a state in violation of its own laws and without acknowledgment by the state of responsibility); De Blake
v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx), slip op. at 5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (act of
state doctrine was applied to expropriation of property but not to claims based on torture by Argentina);
see also Henkin, supra note 51, at 806.
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The doctrine is viewed as a prudential accommodation to the political
branches. 56 Its application requires courts to balance factors such as the
sensitivity of the issues in question and the implications for foreign policy,
the extent of the political branches' involvement in the issues and the
potential for judicial interference, and the extent of international consensus
on the issue.57
II. Tel-Oren
In Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 58 the survivors and repre-
sentatives of persons killed in a terrorist attack in Israel brought suit against
the Libyan Arab Republic, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
and other Arab organizations for compensatory and punitive damages. The
complaints alleged tortious acts in violation of treaties 59 and customary
international law.60
The plaintiffs included both United States citizens and aliens. The
United States citizens asserted federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 61
The alien plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under section 1350.
56. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[l~t is a
prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in sensitive areas."); De Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx), slip op. at3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (actof state doctrine is
prudential in nature).
57. InternationalAss'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1361; see Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Another
issue is whether the act of state doctrine should bar claims based upon violations of human rights,
particularly violations that international law clearly prohibits. The purpose of the act of state doctrine is
to prevent interference with the conduct of diplomacy. See supra note 53. The Supreme Court has stated
that the stronger the international consensus on an issue, the more appropriate judicial review will be.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The State Department has indicated that once a court concludes that there
is an international consensus that a particular right is protected, there is little danger that judicial
enforcement will impair United States foreign policy efforts. Memorandum, supra note 20, at 604.
Thus, the purpose of the doctrine will be accomplished best if it is applied solely to cases where there is
international controversy over whether the alleged acts violate protected rights. Given the international
controversy regarding terrorism, the act of state doctrine could reasonably be applied to terrorist acts
officially committed by a state within its own terrority. The doctrine could not be applied to official acts
of torture because there is an international consensus that torture is prohibited. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
884; De Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984)
(damages awarded for torture); RESTATEMrNT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702(d) (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1982) (customary international law prohibits torture); Memorandum, supra note 20, at 592 ("Interna-
tional custom also indicates that nations have accepted as law an obligation to observe fundamental
human rights."); id. at 597 ("the protection against torture must be considered a fundamental human
right"); id. at 604.
58. 517 F. Supp. 542 (1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354
(1985).
59. The plaintiffs cited numerous treaties and United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Tel-
Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545-46.
60. Id. at 548.
61. Id. at 545; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (diversity).
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The district court dismissed the action on two grounds: lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,62 and expiration of the applicable statute of limita-
tions. 63 The court's holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction stem-
med from its decision that section 1350 is only a jurisdictional statute,
under which plaintiffs must establish an independent cause of action. 64 As
the court noted, international law has traditionally provided only for claims
by sovereign states. 65 The court stated that the required cause of action must
provide for private claims based on violations of international law. The
treaties cited by the plaintiffs did not provide a private cause of action
because the court held they were not self-executing. 66 The court then held
that customary international law had not reached a level of consensus that
would provide a private cause of action for violations of human rights. 67
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, with separate
concurring opinions filed by Judges Edwards, Robb, and Bork. 68
Judge Edwards based dismissal on the lack of a "tort in violation of the
law of nations."' 69 The opinion, following the method established in
Filartiga, examined international law to determine whether it prohibited
the alleged tortious acts. 70 The lack of international consensus on two
issues, the legality of terrorist acts and the legal status of the non-state
defendants, convinced him that international law also did not prohibit the
attack in Tel-Oren.71 Although Judge Edwards concluded that the plaintiffs
in Tel-Oren had not asserted a claim based on a violation of the "law of
nations," his reasoning would not foreclose assertion of section 1350
claims based on other tortious acts if those acts could be shown to violate
international law.
62. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549.
63. Id. at 550.
64. Id. at 549-5 1.
65. Id. at 549. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 572-73 (2d
ed. 1973).
66. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823 (Robb, J.,
concurring).
69. Judge Edwards concluded that international law did not yet prohibit terrorist attacks. Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
70. Judge Edwards used four propositions established in Filartiga:
(1) the "law of nations" evolves over time and must be construed as it currently exists, not as it
existed in 1789 when § 1350 was written;
(2) one source of international law is the customs and usages of civilized nations;
(3) international law does prohibit torture by state officials; and
(4) Section 1350 provides jurisdiction over rights currently recognized in international law.
Id. at 777.
71. Judge Edwards concluded that sufficient international consensus did not exist to hold non-state
defendants liable for violations of international law. Id. at 776, 795.
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In contrast, Judge Robb's expansive reading of the political question
doctrine would foreclose assertion of any section 1350 claims. Although
Judge Robb used the political question doctrine to justify the dismissal of
Tel-Oren,72 the opinion is actually an attack on the competency of the
courts with regard to international issues.73 He believes the Filartiga
decision was erroneous, and concludes that the courts should avoid the
complex issues raised by customary international law and actions of
foreign states.74 His application of the political question doctrine dras-
tically enlarges the scope of judicial deference to include almost any
foreign affairs issue, even when claims do not challenge government
actions or policies. 75
Judge Bork would also foreclose adjudication of any section 1350 claims
by creating a broad new doctrine of judicial deference to the political
branches on foreign affairs issues.76 The underlying theme of Judge Bork's
opinion is a restrictive view of the judicial role.77 The restrictive view
repudiates Congress' jurisdictional mandate to the courts, 78 yet justifies the
repudiation as deference to the political branches.
The opinion begins with the premise that section 1350 is merely a
jurisdictional statute, under which plaintiffs must establish an independent
cause of action. 79 Earlier courts either had assumed that the statute pro-
vided a cause of action, 80 or had found one in domestic law.81 Judge Bork
rejected both of these positions and searched instead for an explicit cause of
action. He decided that neither treaties nor customary international law
provided one.82 Judge Bork then concluded that courts should not infer a
cause of action because doing so would interfere with the conduct of
72. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Robb rejects any review of § 1350 claims because of "the inherent inability of federal
courts to deal with cases such as this one").
74. Id. at 827.
75. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
77. Judge Bork has expressed this view in other cases. See, e.g., De Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting) (separation of powers issues should bar
jurisdiction in case involving the United States military in Honduras); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d
1355, 1357 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring) (separation of powers should preclude standing in suit
regarding United States military presence in El Salvador).
78. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
79. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880; supra notes 13, 15, 16 (cases cited).
81. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D. Md. 1961) (withholding child custody a domestic tort
providing a cause of action).
82. The cause of action issue is beyond the scope of this Note. It has been thoroughly discussed in a
recent article. D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of
Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L LAW 92 (1985).
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foreign affairs by the political branches: "The factors counselling hesita-
tion are constitutional; they derive from principles of separation of
powers."83 On a first reading the cause of action issue appears to be the
focus of Judge Bork's opinion, but it is actually only a device enabling him
to conclude that the federal courts should not participate in issues relating
to foreign affairs. Whether or not an explicit cause of action exists is much
less important than whether separation of powers issues do require judicial
abstention in cases like Tel-Oren.
Judge Bork uses the act of state and political question doctrines as
evidence of separation of powers principles that justify declining jurisdic-
tion, 84 even though neither doctrine applies to Tel-Oren.85 The result is an
impressionistic mosaic of arguments-with the overall message that courts
are not competent to adjudicate section 1350 claims.
III. ANALYSIS
Judges Robb and Bork justify the dismissal of Tel-Oren in a variety of
ways, including the political question doctrine, the lack of a cause of
action, and the impact on diplomatic efforts by the executive branch.
Underlying these justifications is the view that this type of issue should be
resolved by the political branches of government, not the courts. Both
opinions go much farther than necessary in order to dismiss Tel-Oren, and
attempt to close the door on adjudication of all section 1350 claims. Yet a
blanket refusal of section 1350 claims is unnecessary because existing
jurisdictional principles will prevent judicial review of most cases. Further-
more, the expanded deference doctrines used by Judges Robb and Bork can
have dangerous consequences for this nations's foreign policy.
A. Applicability of the Political Question Doctrine
Because of the ongoing controversy surrounding the political question
doctrine, it is difficult to define when courts should apply it. However,
judicial practice indicates a fundamental difference between Tel-Oren and
those cases in which the political question doctrine has been deter-
minative. 86 In Tel-Oren, there was no challenge, direct or implied, to an
action or policy of either the legislative or executive branch. The District of
83. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 801-02 (Bork, J., concurring).
85. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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Columbia Circuit itself has stated that issues that are not "sweeping
challenges" to the Executive's foreign policy typically are adjudicated. 87
1. "Manageable Standards"
Judge Robb stretched the Baker factors in an attempt to make them apply
to the facts in Tel-Oren. First, he concluded the court lacked standards for
defining an international tort, and for determining responsibility for the
injury.88 The absence of international consensus on the status of terrorist
acts was taken to be an absence of applicable standards. Yet this lack of
consensus is itself the clearest standard of all:89 it indicates that customary
international law does not yet prohibit terrorism. This is the essence of
Judge Edward's reasoning in dismissing Tel-Oren.90 Judge Robb has con-
fused the very standard used successfully by United States courts in cases
involving customary international law9' with the lack of a standard.
Judge Robb also concluded the court would be unable to determine
responsibility for the injuries claimed in Tel-Oren92 based on the assump-
tion that essential evidence would be unavailable either due to its con-
fidential nature or due to the impossibility of compelling discovery. 93 The
District of Columbia Circuit rejected similar reasoning in a later case, De
Arellano v. Weinberger.94 The lower court had dismissed a claim based on
the United States military's expropriation of property in Honduras because
of the hypothesized unavailability of confidential communications. 95 The
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, stating that it was premature to
conclude on the basis of the complaint and the pleadings that the evidence
87. De Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 1512 (political question doctrine not applicable to a
claim based on the United States military's expropriation of land in Honduras for military exercises).
88. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
89. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (court lacked jurisdiction
over a § 1350 claim because there is no "universal or generally accepted substantive rule or principle"
governing child custody); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 ("[A] threshold question on the
jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates the law of nations."); supra note 16 (cases
cited); R. FALK, supra note 7, at 10 (requirement of social consensus is a condition precedent to the
validity of any substantive rule of international law).
90. Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
91. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900) (state practice that prohibited seizure of an
enemy's fishing vessels had developed into a customary international law); United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820) (sufficient international consensus existed to define "piracy"); see
supra notes 16, 87 (cases cited).
92. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-24 (Robb, J., concurring).
93. Id.; Tigar, supra note 21, at 1165 (rules of evidence should be used instead of the political
question doctrine when evidence may not be available).
94. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95. Id. at 1513.
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would be undiscoverable. 96 If it turned out that Executive privilege did
make essential evidence unavailable, the district court could take appropri-
ate action at that time. 97
Judge Robb also speculated that ties exist between the PLO and the
Soviet Union. 98 Since the court could not compel participation by such
parties, he concluded the court should not begin the trial process "in the
face of an overwhelming probability of frustration." 99 However, the link
between the PLO and the Soviet Union is purely hypothetical, and its
relevance to the claim was not established. If it later becomes apparent that
this "link" prevented the court from obtaining essential evidence, the court
could then dismiss the case. Until that time, dismissal is premature.
2. "Need for a Single-Voiced Statement"
In Baker, the Supreme Court referred to the need for a single-voiced
statement on many foreign relations questions. 100 In the analysis that
followed, the Court examined cases in which the courts should not act
because an independent judicial determination would contradict explicit
government pronouncements. 101 However, Judge Robb applied this con-
cept to hypothetical secret negotiations with the PLO that might be endan-
gered by judicial inquiry, 10 2 not to any explicit Executive decision regard-
ing the Middle East.
Judge Robb also maintained that attempts to discover the instigators of
the terrorist attack might cause disclosures detrimental to United States
diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. 103 However, the availability of the
Executive privilege to prevent disclosure of sensitive materials makes this
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Attorney General v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(dismissal is improper "when information which 'might' be relevant to a... claim is unavailable for
discovery"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983); cf Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C.
1982). aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (1983) (court did not have the resources to determine factual issues
regarding United States military involvement in El Salvador). For material on the Executive privilege.
see generally C. MCCORMICK, McCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 107 (2d ed. 1972).
98. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 n. I (Robb, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 824.
100. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212.
101. Id. at 212-14.
102. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 824-25 (Robb, J., concurring); see supra note 42 (cases cited). Tel-
Oren is quite unlike the direct challenge to the executive's policies regarding Latin America that
produced a dismissal in Sanchez-Espinoza due to the political question doctrine. Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596,598 (D.D.C. 1983). The claims for damages in Tel-Oren are more similar to
the claims in De Arellano v. Weinberger arising from the United States military's expropriation of
property in Honduras. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Yet the appeals court did not apply the political
question doctrine in that case, even though the claim was asserted directly against an arm of the United
States government, and appeared to challenge a policy of that branch. Id. at 1515.
103. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 825 (Robb, J., concurring).
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unlikely. Therefore, it does not provide an appropriate basis for judicial
abstention.
An analogous situation arises when the courts fulfill their statutory
obligation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act1°4 and determine
that a state with which the United States has "sensitive" relations is not
immune from suit. 0 5 A major purpose of having the courts determine
sovereign immunity rather than the State Department is to place the
responsibility on a "neutral" body, thereby insulating diplomatic efforts
from the effects of judicial decisions and eliminating the lack of uniformity
arising from determinations by an agency that is subject to political
pressures and considerations. 106
The same reasoning applies to adjudication of section 1350 claims.
Permitting political considerations to control adjudication of these claims
would encourage parties to apply diplomatic pressure to the State Depart-
ment. 107 If international law is not enforceable in United States courts, the
world community will have less respect both for the laws protecting human
rights, and for the leadership of the United States in the human rights field.
104. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
105. E.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 901 (E.D. La. 1981)
(Nicaragua was not immune from suit in a case arising from withholding of funds by the state bank);
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,673 (D.D.C. 1980) (Chile was not immune from suit in
a case arising from the assassination of the former Chilean ambassador).
106. The congressional report explaining the FSIA states:
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the
executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of
immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and underprocedures that insure due process. The Department of State would
be freed from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from
any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that
immunity.
H.R. REt'. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6604, 6606; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976) (testimony of
Bruno A. Ristau, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Testimony of Bruno A. Ristau]; id. at 31 ("[T]he
bill is designed to depoliticize the area of sovereign immunity by placing the responsibility for
determining questions of immunity in the courts.").
107. Testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, supra note 106, at 34 ("[W]e are strongly convinced that it's
much better to forgo a system in which some government is putting strong pressure on the Department
of State to decide a lawsuit-we would much rather see it handled by the courts."); id. at 35 ("[I]n
practice I would have to say to you in candor that the State Department, being a political institution, has
not always been able to resist these pressures. And to my way of thinking, this consideration of political
factors is, in fact, the very antithesis of the rule of law which we would like to see established.").
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3. Exclusive Domain of the Political Branches
The Robb opinion states that the judiciary has only acted in cases
involving foreign affairs issues when the question is precisely defined. 108 In
fact, the judiciary has only refrained from acting when the political
branches have expressly asserted control over a foreign affairs issue within
their constitutional powers. 109
Judge Robb views the existence of various legislative committees on
terrorism, and statements by the President, as evidence that the political
branches have more expertise on terrorism than the courts. 110 However, this
type of expertise is far different from the references in Baker to a history of
management by the political branches in areas such as recognition of
foreign governments."' It would be a drastic expansion of the political
question doctrine for the courts to defer on issues simply because they are
being studied by the political branches.
4. Injurious Consequences of Judicial Action
Judge Robb's opinion concludes by predicting horrific consequences if
jurisdiction over section 1350 claims is accepted. 112 The "certain results"
include: embarassment to the nation, the use of trials for political forums,
the debasement of notions of civilized conduct, and a flood of claims by
victims from all over the globe. 113
The argument overlooks the other principles that limit adjudication of
section 1350 claims."14 It also overlooks the consequences of refusing
jurisdiction. The United States tries to fill a leadership role in the protection
of human rights. It would be truly embarrassing for this leader to refuse to
enforce international laws protecting those rights. 115 The debasement of
108. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 825 (Robb, J., concurring) ("The conduct of foreign affairs has never
been accepted as a general area of judicial competence. Particular exceptions have, of course, arisen.
When the question is precisely defined . . . the judiciary has not hesitated to decide cases connected
with American foreign policy.").
109. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. at 212-14 (1962) (cases cited therein); De Arellano v.
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[i]ssues which are not at base sweeping challenges
to the Executive's foreign policy typically are adjudicated"); Tigar, supra note 21, at 1168. For cases
where the court has made a determination on the merits, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (President could not seize the nation's steel mills); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677,686 (1900) (customary international law prohibited the United States' seizure of
an enemy's fishing boats).
110. Tel-Oren, 726 E2d at 825-26 (Robb, J., concurring).
11I. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212.
112. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 826.
114. See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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commonly accepted notions of civilized conduct that Judge Robb fears
would indeed occur if diplomatic pressures were allowed to close the doors
of justice to the victims of torture and other gross violations of human
dignity.
B. Applicability of the Separation of Powers Doctrine
To justify the dismissal of Tel-Oren and at the same time foreclose
adjudication of any section 1350 claim, Judge Bork created a new doctrine
of judicial deference to the political branches on a broad range of foreign
affairs issues. He used the political question and act of state doctrines as
evidence of constitutional separation of powers issues requiring deference.
Yet Judge Bork declined application of the political question doctrine,1
16
and admitted that under current law the act of state doctrine did not apply to
the facts in Tel-Oren.117 Thus, two narrow deference doctrines that do not
apply to the Tel-Oren case are added up to form a deference doctrine of
enormous breadth.
Judge Bork relied on two factors in Tel-Oren to justify a broad deference
doctrine: (1) the possible impact of a judicial pronouncement on sensitive
negotiations concerning the Middle East; 18 and (2) the lack of interna-
tional consensus on the legal status of terrorism and the liability of non-
state parties. 119 If these factors mandate that a special deference doctrine be
116. "It is probably better not to invoke the political question doctrine in this case. That the
contours of the doctrine are murky and unsettled is shown by the lack of consensus about its meaning
among the members of the Supreme Court, and among scholars." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803 n.8 (Bork,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see supra notes
28-50 and accompanying text.
117. The act of state doctrine only applies to acts by states, yet most of the defendants in Tel-Oren
were organizations, including the Libyan Arab Republic, the PLO, the Palestine Information Office, the
National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America. Tel-Oren, 726
F.2d at 775 (per curiam). Although Judge Bork admits the doctrine does not apply to non-state actors
such as the PLO, he suggests that it should be expanded to include them. Id. at 804 (Bork, J.,
concurring). Under current law, Libya is the only defendant in Tel-Oren that could possibly invoke the
act of state doctrine. Even in the case of Libya, the doctrine would only apply if the official "act"
occurred in Libya. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Since the actual attack took place in Israel,
some earlier related act by Libya, such as the training of the assailants, would have to be shown before
the act of state doctrine would arguably apply. In addition, Libya would have to acknowledge that the act
was officially authorized, and produce evidence that it was committed in the state's public capacity.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,691 (1976) (party asserting an act of
state had the burden of proving it was officially authorized). The doctrine has not been applied when it is
unclear whether the acts in question were authorized by the state in pursuit of a public interest. Id. at 694
(insufficient evidence that agents appointed by the Cuban government had been vested with sovereign
authority to repudiate debts; act must be a "public act of those with authority to exercise sovereign
powers and was entitled to respect in our courts"); InternationalAss'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1360
(sovereign's motivations must be examined for a public interest basis).
118. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805 (Bork, J., concurring).
119. Id.at805-06.
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applied, the doctrine would not only bar adjudication of section 1350
claims, but could well preclude judicial review of any claim involving
either customary international law or a party that has "sensitive" diplo-
matic relations with the United States government. 120 Thus, the deference
doctrine Judge Bork advocates is not narrow like the act of state and
political question doctrines, but is a doctrine of total surrender to the
political branches on foreign affairs issues. This surrender seems to rest on
three assumptions: first, that the Constitution requires the judiciary to defer
to the political branches on foreign affairs; second, that the political
branches desirejudicial abstention in foreign affairs issues; and third, that a
broad deference doctrine is necessary to prevent section 1350 claims from
flooding the federal courts.
1. Deference to the Political Branches Is Not Constitutionally Required
The political question and act of state doctrines have constitutional
"underpinnings," but are not constitutionally required. 12 1 The Supreme
Court has deliberately applied the doctrines infrequently, and only to a
narrow set of fact patterns. 122 It is hard to see how the constitutional
underpinnings that give rise to two narrow doctrines could justify the
sweeping doctrine advocated by Judge Bork. What the Constitution does
require is that Congress assign jurisdiction to the judiciary under Article
III, and that the judiciary accept any constitutional assignment of jurisdic-
tion. 123
2. The Political Branches Do Not Want Deference
The proponents of the restrictive judicial role in foreign relations ignore
a variety of calls by both political branches forjudicial action in this sphere.
In the name of deference, the restrictive view rejects the legislature's power
to assign jurisdiction over foreign affairs issues to the courts.
The first mandate to consider is the Alien Tort Claims Act itself. The Act
was probably intended to direct claims affecting foreign relations to federal
120. There is no apparent limitation on the issues encompassed by this broad deference doctrine. It
would apply to cases brought by nonaliens under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdic-
tion). Judge Bork has advocated deference in other cases involving foreign affairs. See supra note 77
and accompanying text.
121. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Henkin, supra note 28, at 600-01.
122. See supra notes 41, 42, 54 and accompanying text.
123. In an early Supreme Court case Justice Marshall stated:
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be
brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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rather than state courts in order to promote uniformity and avoid provin-
cialism. 24 Even if Congress' precise intentions are unknown, the legis-
lature intended that some type of claim be justiciable under the statute. Yet
the opinions of Judges Robb and Bork would effectively foreclose any
claims under the Act. 125 When a statute is ambiguous, the court's obliga-
tion is to construe it, but not to construe it out of existence. 126 This
supposed deference is actually an abdication of the responsibility assigned
to the courts by Congress.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 127 is another example of a
legislative delegation to the courts of jurisdiction over cases involving
foreign affairs. The FSIA establishes exceptions to the general rule that
sovereign states are immune from suit in the courts of another state unless
they consent to the forum state's jurisdiction. The statute transferred
responsibility for determining when a foreign state is immune from suit
from the executive branch to the judiciary. 28 The shift relieved the State
Department of the diplomatic consequences attendant on determinations of
sovereign immunity. 129 Congress deliberately left considerable room for
judicial discretion in applying the FSIA 130 even though cases brought under
the FSIA have foreign policy implications that are at least as broad as those
in Tel-Oren. 131 Yet the courts have not shirked their statutory obligation to
determine the immunity issue. The responsibility allocated to the judiciary
under the FSIA is a clear indication that the political branches sometimes
prefer that foreign relations issues be resolved by the courts.
The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistahce Act 32 is
another indication that the political branches do not desire judicial absten-
tion in foreign affairs issues. After the Supreme Court used the adt.of state
doctrine to decline review of Cuban expropriations, 133 Congress passed the
Hickenlooper Amendment to further restrict the already narrow act of state
doctrine. The amendment prohibited courts from using the act of state
124. See supra note 12.
125. See supra notes 73-75, 119-20 and accompanying text. Judge Bork refers to three torts the
1789 Congress might have had in mind. Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 813-16 (Bork, J., concurring). However,
his analysis seems to preclude a private cause of action under modem law even for those torts. Id. at 790
(Edwards, J., concurring).
126. Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 790 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 46.06 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) (statutes should be construed so that no
part is inoperative or void).
127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611(1982).
128. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 106, at 7.
129. See supra notes 104-05.
130. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 106, at 16 ("The courts would have a great deal of latitude in
determining what is a 'commercial activity' for purposes of this bill.").
131. E.g., supra note 105 (cases cited).
132. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
133. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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doctrine to decline determining the merits in expropriation cases involving
alleged violations of international law.
Other actions by the political branches indicate that the protection of
international human rights is a high priority for the United States govern-
ment, a goal the judiciary should help to meet. For example, Congress has
passed legislation that mandates consideration of human rights violations
in allocations of economic and military aid. 134 In addition, the State
Department encouraged the Filartiga court to accept jurisdiction over a
section 1350 claim, stating that "[A] refusal to recognize a private cause of
action. . . might seriously damage the credibility of our nation's commit-
ment to the protection of human rights. " 135
Rather than requesting judicial abstention, both of the political branches
have clearly indicated that the judiciary should have a role in cases involv-
ing foreign affairs. Action by the judiciary assists the political branches by
promoting the policies those branches have established, and by separating
the determination of private claims from the conduct of diplomacy.
3. A Broad Deference Doctrine is Unecessary
The opinions by Judges Robb and Bork both raise the specter of United
States courts flooded with section 1350 claims brought by victims from all
over the globe. 136 The opinions overlook the existence of other principles
that limit adjudication of section 1350 claims. These principles include: (1)
act of state; (2) sovereign immunity; (3) forum non conveniens; and (4) the
requirement that a section 1350 claim be based on a violation of the law of
nations. A brief explanation of these limiting principles will demonstrate
that fears of a deluge of section 1350 claims are unfounded. 137
The act of state doctrine 138 would apply in cases involving an official act
by a foreign state within its own territory. In some cases, particularly those
involving expropriations of property, the courts refrain from examining the
legality of the state's acts. 139 Although it is unclear whether the doctrine
would bar claims based upon official acts of torture or terrorism, 140 some
section 1350 claims would fall within the doctrine and be nonjusticiable.
134. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n, 2304 (1982).
135. Memorandum, supra note 20, at 604.
136. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826-27 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Bork does not raise this issue
explicitly but seems to imply the same concern. Id. at 812, 821 (Bork, J., concurring).
137. See generally Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 97-103 (1981):
Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation ofInternational Law: Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 33 STAN. L. REV.
353, 363-68 (1981).
138. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Sovereign immunity is the principle most likely to limit section 1350
claims. 141 Generally, in order for an act to be a violation of the law of
nations it must be committed by a state or its agent. 142 However, under the
FSIA, foreign states and their agents are immune from tort claims brought
in U.S. courts unless the tort occurs in the United States. 143 Therefore the
FSIA would bar the claims in Tel-Oren against Libya, since the terrorist
attack occurred in Israel. 144
It is unlikely that section 1350 claims will often be brought against the
individual who actually committed the act because the court will be unable
to obtain personal jurisdiction and service of process. Usually the defend-
ant will be a foreign state or instrumentality. Therefore, if the FSIA applies
to section 1350 claims, 145 only those cases with claims arising from torts
occurring in the United States would escape the bar of sovereign immu-
nity. 146
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 147 a court could decline
jurisdiction over a section 1350 claim if: (1) it was likely that justice would
be done in the situs court; and (2) the alternate forum was more convenient
for adjudication of the claim. 148 Although claims based on officially
authorized human rights violations are unlikely to receive a fair trial in the
141. However, there is controversy over whether the FSIA should apply to § 1350 claims. At one
time international law extended blanket immunity to all acts by foreign sovereigns. The FSIA carved
exceptions out of this broad immunity shield for commercial activities by foreign states or their agents.
But now the general rule of immunity upon which the exceptions were based may have changed. If
current international law would not extend immunity to a foreign state's violations of human rights, then
it is arguable that the FSIA should not do so either, particularly since neither the sphere of human rights
nor the role of § 1350 was considered during drafting of the statute. See Amicus Brief of American
Civil Liberties Union on petition to reopen De Blake v. Republic of Argentina at 9; Memorandum,
supra note 20, at 602. On reconsideration, the De Blake court decided that sovereign immunity did bar
the torture claims. De Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT(MCx) (D.C. Cal. March
7, 1985).
142. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATnONS § 702 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (only acts practiced,
encouraged, or condoned by the state are listed as violations of customary international law); United
Nations Declaration on Torture, G. A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc.
A-10034 (1975) (torture is defined as severe pain or suffering "intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of a public official"). An individual torturer is liable for the crime of torture, but only if it was
committed in his or her official capacity. Most crimes by individuals without official status are not
violations of international law. Piracy and slave trading are exceptions to this rule. Those crimes are
considered to be crimes against all humanity even if there is no link to a state. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982).
144. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774.
145. See supra note 141.
146. The Filartiga court managed to avoid the seeming paradox that an act must be official to be a
violation of international law, yet an official act is immune from suit, by finding that the defendant
torturer "acted under color of official authority," but lacked the kind of overt authorization that would
make the torture a "public" act immune under the FSIA. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889-90.
147. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1352 n.63 (2d ed. 1969).
148. Blum, supra note 137, at 103.
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situs state, the availability of an alternate forum may justify dismissal of
some section 1350 claims.
The final principle that limits adjudication of section 1350 claims is the
requirement that the tort violate "the law of nations. " 149 When there is no
treaty in force on the subject, customary international law must provide the
necessary prohibition. 150 The fundamental requirements for the existence
of a binding customary law are: (1) the existence of a widespread, consist-
ent practice by states; and (2) evidence that states consider the practice
obligatory. 151 The party asserting the existence of a customary law has the
burden of proving its existence, 152 an extremely difficult task. 153 Only a
handful of claims are likely to meet these requirements. Claims based on
genocide, slavery, torture, or prolonged detention without trial have the
greatest chance of success. 154
It is evident that few section 1350 claims will survive application of all
these limiting principles. In the rare instances where a customary law basis
can be proven, sovereign immunity is likely to bar adjudication. Instead of
the flood of cases feared by Judges Robb and Bork, Filartiga may well be
the only claim adjudicated for many years, due to the unique circumstances
that brought the individual torturer within the court's jurisdiction. 155
4. A Broad Deference Doctrine Would be Detrimental To Foreign
Affairs
Proponents of the restrictive judicial role ignore the important part that
domestic courts play in the evolution of international law, 156 and the
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
150. See generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774 (Judges Edwards and Bork assumed that treaties and
customary law must both be examined); Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (the court assumed that both treaties
and customary law should be considered).
151. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 65, at 4-11; 0. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 21 (1981).
152. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 65, at 11; Asylum Case (Colo. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 276-77 ("The
party which relies on a custom . . . must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it
has become binding on the other party. ").
153. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 65, at 6-8.
154. See Blum, supra note 137, at 90-97 (there is international consensus that genocide, summary
execution, slavery, and torture violate international law); Comment, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789-
Political Torture Provides Federal Jurisdiction Under the Statute, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213, 220
(1980). A list of "internationally recognized human rights" is included in the Foreign Assistance Act,
which requires that a nation's human rights record be considered in the allocation of economic and
military aid. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1982); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982) (genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic
racial discrimination are violations of customary international law).
155. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79 (defendant entered the U.S. on a visitor's visa and the plaintiffs
happened to learn of his presence).
156. See generally R. FALK, supra note 7.
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national interest in affecting the course that evolution takes. 157 The rulings
of domestic courts are part of the state practice that can become customary
international law. 158 Customary international law is binding on all states,
with the exception of those that "persistently object" to the practice. 159
Given the political tensions attendant on treaty-making, it is customary law
that is most likely to eventually prohibit acts such as terrorism. 160 Clearly
there is a strong national interest in having international law continue to
grow, and in having United States courts participate in that process and
affect its outcome.
Furthermore, the international legal system is largely decentralized and
dependent on domestic courts for enforcement of international norms. 161
Enforcement strengthens the international legal order, makiig it better able
to promote peace and stability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the particular facts and the state of current international law, the
claims in Tel-Oren had to be dismissed. However, Judges Robb and Bork
went much further than necessary and attempted to bar adjudication of any
section 1350 claim by drastically expanding the scope of judicial deference
to the political branches. Their sweeping deference doctrines remove
practically any case involving foreign affairs from judicial review. Dan-
gerous consequences may result from such broad judicial abstention,
including increased diplomatic pressures on the State Department, and a
157. Id. at 92; id. at 12-13 ("The United States is the dominant law-oriented state. As a result, it
possesses a special responsibility that can only be discharged by a self-conscious realization of its long-
term interests in the development of a more stable world order.").
158. I. BROWNLE, supra note 65, at 5; R. FALK, supra note 7, at 10 ("Noneconomic human rights
illustrate an area within which courts might contribute to the formulation and application of common
standards, thereby making a positive contribution to the development of international law."); Statute of
the International Court of Justice, Article 38(l)(d), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATUTE AND RULES OF CouRTr & OTHER DOcUMENTs 77 (1978). The
fact that the International Court of Justice may consider judicial decisions of the various nations as a
source of international law indicates that court decisions are both evidence of what the current law is,
and part of the state practice that creates new customary law.
159. I. BROWNLm, supra note 65, at 10.
160. Multilateral treaties regarding human rights tend to remain in the drafting stage for a long
time. For example, work was begun in 1978 on a United Nations convention against torture that was not
adopted until December 1984. U.N. Doc. A-RES-39-46 (1984). Once completed, states are quick to
sign the treaties but slow to ratify them. Th6United States has not yet ratified the two basic human rights
documents that were signed in 1977: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in
Force, Jan. 1, 1984. International disagreement is particularly fierce regarding terrorism. See Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussion of divergent views regarding terrorism expressed
in United Nations documents).
161. See R. FALK, supra note 7; Memorandum, supra note 20, at 603 n.44 (cases cited).
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loss by the United States of its current leadership position in the world
community on human rights issues.
Instead of a broad deference doctrine, courts should apply the methods
established in Filartiga and followed by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren. A
broad deference doctrine is not necessary in order to limit the section 1350
claims reviewed by federal courts. Existing jurisdictional principles will
prevent adjudication of all but a few claims. Use of these existing jurisdic-
tional principles on a case-by-case basis will avoid the impacts on foreign
affairs caused by the broad deference doctrines, but will result in dismissal
of claims such as those in Tel-Oren that are simply not justiciable under
current international law.
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